Law & Society

Material Support of Foreign Terrorist Organizations vs. Freedom of Speech and Association Founded in 1974, the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) was established as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group composed of Turkish Kurds who formed to seek Kurdish independence from Turkey. By the late 1990s the group had had morphed from a rural-based insurgent group into a full-fledged terrorist organization, sometimes using suicide bombings on civilian targets.

Founded in 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became one of the most lethal and well organized terrorist groups in the world that, beginning in 1983, waged an armed campaign in Sri Lanka to establish a separate Tamil homeland before the group was defeated by the Sri Lanka army in May 2009. The LTTE pioneered the use of suicide belts.
Both groups are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S Department of State.

The evidence is clear that the PKK and LTTE have engaged in terrorist activities, including suicide bombings, which have harmed innocent civilians. It was these kinds of international terrorist acts and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that prompted the U.S. Congress to enact the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which was signed into law by former President Bill Clinton in April 1996.

One of the controversial components of AEDPA was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B which makes it a federal crime to provide “material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.” While Congress has amended the definition of “material support or resources” a number of times since 1996, Subsection 2339A (b) (1) offers the current definition:

“[T]he term ‘material support or resources’ means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”

Another component of AEDPA, the authority to designate an entity as a “foreign terrorist organization,” was codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a) (1), (d) (4). This authority rests with the Secretary of State who, after consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and Attorney General, must determine whether the organization is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism,” and “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.”

In 1997 former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Two of the groups on that list were PKK and LTTE.

The Humanitarian Law Project, which was founded in 1985 and is “dedicated to protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict by using established international human rights law and humanitarian law,” filed a lawsuit in 1998 challenging the “material support or resources” provisions of § 2339B. The lawsuit’s long convoluted history found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court and, on June 21, 2010, that court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project upheld the constitutionality of the terrorism statute.

The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) filed its lawsuit because, according to the group, § 2339B prevented it from providing support for the humanitarian and political activities of PKK. This included: (1) “training members of PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey”; and (3) “teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” HLP also charged that § 2339B prevented it from providing monetary contributions, legal training, and political advocacy for the LTTE. This included: (1) “train members of LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies”; (2) “offer their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements between LTTE and the Sri Lankan government;” and (3) “engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.”

The HLP based its lawsuit on three constitutional challenges to § 2339B: 1) it violated their First Amendment freedom of speech; and 2) it violated their First Amendment freedom of association. These two challenges were premised on the theory that § 2339B criminalized their support to PKK and LTTE without the Government having to prove that HLP had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those groups. Finally, HLP challenged § 2339B as being unconstitutionally vague.

A central issue in the case initially focused on exactly what constituted “personnel” and training.” While the lawsuit was pending, and in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act) which amended the “material support or resources” provision of § 2339B to include the term “expert advice or assistance.” The HLP filed a second lawsuit, which was ultimately consolidated with the first one, challenging this amended provision as well.

In 2004, Congress once again amended the “material support or resources” provisions of § 2339B with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). This statute clarified the “mental state” necessary to violate § 2339B by requiring knowledge of a group’s designation as a terrorist organization or its commission of terrorist acts before criminal charges could be brought. IRTPA also added the term “service” to the definition of “material support or resources” and defined “training” to mean “instruction or teaching designed to support a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge. IRTPA also defined “expert advice or assistance” as “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” And finally IRTPA clarified the reach of the term “personnel” by providing:

“No person shall be prosecuted under [§ 2339B] in connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may include himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.”

The Vagueness Issue

The Supreme Court had before it four terms central to HLR’s argument that § 2339B is impermissibly vague: “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “services,” and “personnel.” The court two years ago in United States v. Williams held a conviction under a statute that is unconstitutionally vague does not comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”

The Supreme Court pointed out that since 2001 the Government has charged approximately 150 persons with violating the provisions of § 2339B and convicted approximately half of them. Since HLP did not challenge the Government’s enforcement discretion of the statute, the court addressed only the issue whether § 2339B provides a person of ordinary intelligence with “fair notice” of what is unlawful. The court began its analysis with the observation that the four terms in question—“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel”—did not require a subjective analysis because Congress has narrowly defined these terms over time. The Court added:

“Much of the activities in which plaintiffs seek to engage readily fall within the scope of the terms ‘training’ and ‘expert advice or assistance.’ Plaintiffs want to ‘train members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes,’ and ‘teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.’ A person of ordinary intelligence would understand the instruction on resolving disputes through international law falls within the statute’s definition of ‘training’ because it imparts a ‘specific skill,’ not ‘general knowledge.’ Plaintiffs’ activities also fall comfortably within the scope of ‘expert advice or assistance’: A reasonable person would recognize that teaching the PKK how to petition for humanitarian relief before the United Nations involves advice derived from, as the statute puts it, ‘specialized knowledge.’ In fact, the plaintiffs themselves have repeatedly used the terms ‘training’ and ‘expert advice’ throughout this litigation to describe their own proposed activities, demonstrating that these common terms readily and naturally cover plaintiff’s conduct.

“Plaintiffs respond by pointing to hypothetical situations designed to test the limits of ‘training’ and ‘expert advice or assistance.’ They argue that the statutory definitions of these terms use words of degree—like ‘specific,’ general,’ and ‘specialized’—and that is difficult to apply those definitions in particular cases … Whatever force these arguments might have in the abstract, they are beside the point here. Plaintiffs do not propose to teach a course on geography, and cannot seek refuge in imaginary cases that straddle the boundary between ‘specific skills’ and ‘general knowledge.’”

The HLP had argued that it wanted to provide “political advocacy” for Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka but because § 2339B is so vague the group hesitated because it was concerned that this would constitute providing “personnel” or “service[s]” prohibited by the statute. The Court addressed these concerns as follows:

“As for ‘personnel,’ Congress enacted a limiting definition in IRTPA that answers plaintiffs’ vagueness concerns. Providing material support that constitutes ‘personnel’ is defined as knowingly providing a person ‘to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.’ The statute makes clear that ‘personnel’ does not cover independent advocacy: ‘Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.’

“’[S]ervice’ similarly refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy … The statute prohibits providing service ‘to a foreign terrorist organization.’ The use of the word ‘to’ indicates a connection between the service and the foreign group. We think a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that independently advocating for a cause is different from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that cause.”

The First Amendment Issues

With respect to the speech issue, the Court pointed out that under § 2339B the “plaintiffs may say anything they wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about the PKK and LTTE, the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and international law. They may advocate before the United Nations. As the Government states: ‘The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.’ Section 2339B also ‘does not prevent [plaintiffs] from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for doing so. Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of ‘pure political speech,’ which most often does not take the form of speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the duration of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.”

With respect to the association issue, the HLP had argued that merely associating with the PKK and LTTE would be criminal under § 2339B. The court brushed aside this claim by pointing out that the statute “does not penalize the mere association with a foreign terrorist organization.” The Supreme Court embraced a finding by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that § 2339B did not prohibit membership in a designated terrorist organization or the vigorous support and promotion of the political goals of the group. The high court concluded its opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, with the following historical admonition:

“The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that the people of the United States ordained and established that charter of government in part to ‘provide for the common defense.’ As Madison explained, ‘[s]ecurity against foreign danger is … an avowed and essential object of the American Union.’ We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”

In his dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, Justice Stephen Breyer stated:

In my view, the Government has not made the strong showing necessary to justify under the First Amendment the criminal prosecution of those who engage in [the training of organizations to use nonviolent means to achieve their goals]. We cannot avoid the constitutional significance of these facts on the basis that some of this speech takes place outside the United States and is directed at foreign governments, for the activities also involve advocacy in this country directed to our government and its policies.

Foreign terrorists have accomplished far more than they intended. They forced this nation to not only combat acts of terrorism but to alter its constitutional landscape in an effort to prevent those terrible deeds. A fight is confronted, it is waged on terms set by the combatants, and it is won or lost on a mixture of skill and misfortune. But the prevention of a fight entails suspicion and paranoia because you never know who the enemy really is. Madison talked about “foreign danger” but purely from a military point of view—a potential invading force. That is not the “danger” presented by terrorism: it could be a foreign national or the neighbor next door. When everyone is a potential suspect, freedom of speech and association are inevitably restricted.

In New York, Tennessee, and a host of other communities, protests are cropping up against Muslims building their places of worship. Our fear and paranoia has grown to the extent that we see “foreign danger” in other peoples’ religion—people who have been our good neighbors for years. This same fear has led our citizenry to abrogate many of its traditionally cherished, and constitutionally protected, freedoms; privacy, searches, associations and speech.

So do we really need statutes like § 2339B? Probably so, but they should be narrowly tailored and very specific in defining the actions they seek to prevent. Unfortunately, with the creation of such statutes, and our fear-inspired acquiescence, we become less of a free nation, less of a free people. And while this drastic change may arguable be necessary for our safety and survival as a nation and a people, the bitter taste it leaves going down is not easy to accept. It is incumbent on groups like Humanitarian Law Project and the American Civil Liberties Union to stand up when they feel the government has over-stepped its constitutionally imposed bounds, otherwise a slippery slope to self imposed fascism is just around the corner. While we might not agree with each stand these groups take, we salute their fortitude and courage to stand.

Child Support
Both parents have an obligation to support a child, regardless of whether the child was born during their marriage.

Determining Parentage
Questions regarding the parentage of a child may arise when one parent seeks to obtain child support from another person alleged to be the parent. If a person denies being the parent of a child, a parentage action (traditionally called a paternity action) may be brought to determine whether the person is in fact the parent of the child.

Genetic testing is commonly used to establish parentage. In some cases, however, genetic parentage may be neither necessary nor sufficient to establish parentage. An obligation to support a child may also arise in a non-parent where that person has, by their conduct, substituted themselves for the child’s parent and allowed the real parent(s) to rely on them to provide support for the child. This occurs most commonly where a stepparent seeks to prevent a former spouse and co-parent of the child from continuing an involvement in the child's life following the stepparent’s intermarriage with the child's other parent.
Actions for Child Support
An action for child support can:
• Be part of a divorce action
• Proceed independently of any action determining the status of the parents
• In many states, be ordered in the context of a domestic violence action

Amount of Child Support
The non-primary residential (or non-custodial) parent usually pays child support to the other parent. The amount of child support is usually determined in accordance with guidelines established by each state. These guidelines are based on the respective incomes of the parents. Under federal law, most states now require some form of periodic review of child support orders to make certain that they remain adequate in light of changes of life circumstances of the parents and child.

Termination of the Support Obligation
The obligation to provide child support can be terminated for the following reasons:
• When the child becomes an adult, which in most states is age 18.
• The death of either the child or the supporting parent. A few recent cases have continued the obligation of child support after the death of the parent on the parent's estate. This remains, at present, a minority view.
• The termination of the parent’s rights by virtue of the adoption of the child by another.
• The emancipation of the child prior to the usual age of adulthood. A child may be emancipated with court permission. However, this permission is sparingly granted and usually requires that the child be clearly self-supporting. Emancipation can also take place if the child marries, or enlists in the armed forces of the United States.

Continuation of the Support Obligation
The obligation to provide child support can be continued into adulthood for following reasons:
• The child's completion of high school if it is not unreasonably delayed.
• During the child's college education if that education is completed on a substantially full-time basis. Many states require that a parent support a child in higher education, including paying the expenses of such education, if it can reasonably be concluded that the parent would have provided such support to a child in a continuing marriage.

Enforcement of the Child Support Obligation
In situations where the parents reside in different states, the following acts provide mechanisms for enforcement for the home state of the child support recipient:
• Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
• Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), predecessors to the UIFSA
• (RURESA), the revised successor to the URESA

These same acts, in most states, also provide means for the interstate enforcement of spousal support.

Indonesia has abundant natural resources and strategic location in the international water, a large number of populations, approximately 230 million people do have the potential and capability to support the investment climate. Indonesia has also made substantial progress in the field of democracy economic reforms and security over the last decade. Indonesia is welcoming foreign capital investors. Establishment of FDI Company
This writing will focused on the procedure of Establishment of FDI Company as one of the means available to conduct direct investment in Indonesia.

In Indonesia, the core of law that regulates FDI Company are Law No. 25 of 2007 regarding Capital Investment (hereinafter referred to as “Investment Law”), and Law No. 40 of 2007 regarding Limited Liability Company (hereinafter referred to as “Company Law”).
The first thing that shall be acknowledge by foreign prospective investors is whether the business field that they wished to conduct in Indonesia is 100% open for foreign capital ownership or closed, or open with requirements. Such determination can be found in Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 36 Year 2010 regarding List of Business Fields Closed ad Open with Conditions to Investment (“negative investment list”).

In event the business field that wished to conduct is apparently open with requirement, for example there exist limitation of foreign capital ownership, and foreign investor shall have Indonesian citizen and/or legal entity as another capital ownership.

It bears to note what meant by establishment of FDI Company is establishment of Limited Liability Company (Perseroan Terbatas “PT”) (hereinafter referred to as “Company”). In line with Article 7 paragraph (1) of Company Law, a Company shall be established at minimum by 2 (two) shareholders.

The process that needs to be conducted for the establishment of FDI Company may be divided into 4 (four) stages. The following are the stages, along with its general information:

Stage of prior obtaining Legal Entity Status;

At the first stage, there are several documents to be obtained:
a. Approval of the intended name of the Company;
b. Approval of Investment Plan (named Registration of Investment);

This approval is considered to be temporary license.

c. Obtain Domicile Letter From the Local Government where the company’s office will be located;
d. Deed of Establishment of the Company (Notarial Deed);
e. Minister of Law and Human Rights Approval (“MOLHR Approval”).

As regulated under Article 7 paragraph (4) Company Law, the legal entity status is obtained by approval from the Minister of Law and Human Rights to the establishment of Company through Minister Decision. is related to the responsibility of legal acts conducted by the founder and the Company. Basically, prior the obtainment of Status of Legal Entity, prospective founder of Company who conducted legal acts shall be personally liable for the cause that may arise. It bears to note that pursuant to Article 14 paragraph (4) and (5) of Company Law, such act will bind the Company if at the latest 60 (sixty) days after Company becomes a legal entity, first general Meeting of Shareholders of Company expressly states acceptance of or assumption of all rights and obligations which arise from legal acts which were undertaken by prospective founders of their proxies.

Stage of after obtaining Legal Entity Status;

At the second stage, there are several documents to be obtained:

a. Opening Bank Account;
b. Obtain Taxpayer Registration Number (“NPWP”) from the Tax Office;

Stage of obtaining Principal License;

Investment Coordinating Board requires principal license for companies with business field that obtained fiscal facility and/or in the implementation of capital investment does require fiscal facility.

The fiscal facilities that provided are:

Import duty facility of import of machines;
Import duty facility of import of goods and materials;
Proposal to obtain facility on Income Tax of Corporate.

Stage of the Company is permitted to commercially produce/operate.

At the fourth stage a Company is required to obtain:

a. Specific License (depends on the business field of the Company);
b. Permanent Business License;

It is a license that shall be possessed by a Company to commercially conduct its production/operation both production of goods and services, as an implementation of the Registration/Principle License/Capital Investment Approval, unless otherwise governed by sectored Laws and Regulations. Thus in order words, when the Company is ready to prior commercially produce or operate its Business Activity, the Company shall possess Business License

c. Company Registration Certificate. Obligation of FDI Company

As one of the means in conducting direct investment, the FDI Company has obligations arise from the Investment Law, and also obligations under the Company Law for its form of Limited Liability Company.

Herewith are some of the obligations bear by the FDI Company:
Capital Investment Activity Report (Laporan Kegiatan Penanaman Modal “LKPM”):
Reports that shall be conveyed for Company that holds Principal License;
Reports that shall be conveyed for Company that holds Company Registration Certificate.

In order to obtain legal certainty that the establishment of FDI Company and the licenses obtained is in line with the prevailing laws and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia, it is highly recommended to have consultation with Indonesian lawyers.

Indonesia, as an archipelagic state, had ratified the International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages 1993. As a continuance, it also ratifies the International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 (“Arrest of Ships Convention”). The purposes of such ratifications are to harmonize and to converge Indonesian Shipping Laws with the other Asian countries’ laws. Such harmonization will also automatically encourage creditors in providing fund for ship procurement. The ratification of the two international instruments brings a consequences that there shall be national legislation which conform those conventions. Indonesia subsequently enacted the Law Number 17 of 2008 regarding Maritime (“Indonesian Maritime Law”). This law serves as harmonization of the two international conventions as well as a gate to the new era of Maritime Law in Indonesia. This paper will focuses itself on the arrest of ship in Indonesia. This paper will be divided into 3 (three) parts. Part I will concentrate on Indonesian Maritime Law, specifically on provisions governing the arrest of ship. This part will also describe the requirements and mechanisms set forth in Indonesian Maritime Law to arrest ship/s. Part II will give the reader general overview of the Arrest of Ships Convention. An overview is deemed important to predict future regulation concerning arrest of ship in practice. This is since the Indonesian Government has not yet issued any enforcement regulation of Indonesian Maritime Law. Part III contains conclusion and recommendation that can be derived from previous parts. II. The Arrest of Ship on Indonesian Maritime Law Indonesian Maritime Law provides that arrest of ship shall be conducted through Court-mechanism. Such mechanism is conducted without filing a lawsuit against the owner of ship. Accordingly, based on Article 222 of Indonesian Maritime Law, Port master can only arrests ship based on written Court order. Such order can be issued based on 2 (two) reasons: a. The ship is connected with criminal matter; or b. The ship is connected with civil matter. In the event that the ship is connected with civil matter, a Court order is made based on a claim known as Maritime Claim. Such claim is conducted without file a lawsuit against the ship. The law also specifically mentions several conditions in which a Maritime Claim may arise. Maritime Claim is defined as a claim arising out of one or more of the following: (a) loss or damage caused by the operation of the ship; (b) loss of life or personal injury occurring, whether on land or on water, in direct connection with the operation of the ship; (c) salvage operations or any salvage agreement, including, if applicable, special compensation relating to salvage operations in respect of a ship which by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment; (d) damage or threat of damage caused by the ship to the environment, coastline or related interests; measures taken to prevent, minimize, or remove such damage; compensation for such damage; costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment actually undertaken or to be undertaken; loss incurred or likely to be incurred by third parties in connection with such damage; and damage, costs, or loss of a similar nature to those identified in this subparagraph (d); (e) costs or expenses relating to the raising, removal, recovery, destruction or the rendering harmless of a ship which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including anything that is or has been on board such ship, and costs or expenses relating to the preservation of an abandoned ship and maintenance of its crew; (f) any agreement relating to the use or hire of the ship, whether contained in a charter party or otherwise; (g) any agreement relating to the carriage of goods or passengers on board the ship, whether contained in a charter party or otherwise; (h) loss of or damage to or in connection with goods (including luggage) carried on board the ship; (i) general average; (j) towage; (k) pilotage; (l) goods, materials, provisions, bunkers, equipment (including containers) supplied or services rendered to the ship for its operation, management, preservation or maintenance; (m) construction, reconstruction, repair, converting or equipping of the ship; (n) port, canal, dock, harbour and other waterway dues and charges; (o) wages and other sums due to the master, officers and other members of the ship's complement in respect of their employment on the ship, including costs of repatriation and social insurance contributions payable on their behalf; (p) disbursements incurred on behalf of the ship or its owners; (q) insurance premiums (including mutual insurance calls) in respect of the ship, payable by or on behalf of the ship owner or demise charterer; (r) any commissions, brokerages or agency fees payable in respect of the ship by or on behalf of the ship owner or demise charterer; (s) any dispute as to ownership or possession of the ship; (t) any dispute between co-owners of the ship as to the employment or earnings of the ship; (u) a mortgage or a "hypothèque" or a charge of the same nature on the ship; (v) any dispute arising out of a contract for the sale of the ship. In relation with these conditions, Indonesian Maritime Law provides that further mechanism regarding arrest of ship will be further regulated by a Minister Regulation. Unfortunately, until the present time, such regulation has not been issued by relevant authorities. As a form of compliance, the regulation will be made in accordance with the Arrest of Ships Convention. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct an overview towards the stated Convention. III. General Overview on Arrest of Ships Convention The Convention defines arrest as any detention or restriction on removal of a ship by order of a Court to secure a Maritime Claim. However, this does not include the seizure of a ship in execution or satisfaction of a judgment or other enforceable instrument. A ship may only be arrested in respect of a Maritime Claim. This means that there exists no other claim against the ship. A ship may be arrested or released from arrest only under the authority of a Court of State in which the arrest is effected. Arrest may be conducted for the purpose of obtaining security. In this vein, Arrest of Ships Convention provides flexibilities. Arrest can be made regardless the existence of a jurisdiction clause or arbitration clause in any relevant contract. The arrest can also be made even if such arrest is to be adjudicated in a State other than the State where the arrest is effected, or is to be arbitrated, or is to be adjudicated subject to the law of another State. Release from Arrest When it comes to the question of how a ship which is arrested can be released, Arrest of Ships Convention expressly provided that a ship shall be released when sufficient security has been provided in a satisfactory form. Nevertheless, this may not be applied in cases of dispute regarding ownership or possession of the ship and dispute between co-owners of the ship as to the employment or earnings of the ship. In these cases, the Court may permit the person in possession of the ship to continue trading the ship, upon such person providing sufficient security, or may otherwise deal with the operation of the ship during the period of the arrest. Satisfactory form means that there shall be an agreement or settlement proposal agreed by both parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Court has authority to determine the nature and the amount of satisfactory form. Nonetheless, such nature and amount shall not exceed the value of the arrested ship. Once the person responsible for the ship has provided sufficient security in satisfactory form, such person may at any time apply to the Court to have that security reduced, modified, or cancelled. Right of Re-arrest and Multiple Arrest Basically, a ship cannot be arrested subsequent to sufficient security given by the person responsible to secure same Maritime Claim. Nonetheless, this is not applicable in several situations. First, the nature or amount of security is inadequate; or second, the person who has already provided the security is not, or is unlikely to be, able to fulfill its obligations; or third, the arrested ship or the security provided was released upon the consent of the Claimant (person who raise Maritime Claim) acting on reasonable grounds; or because the Claimant cannot, by taking reasonable steps, prevent the release. Protection of Owners and Demise Charterers of the Arrested Ships To arrest a ship, one shall be careful in examining the grounds. This is since the Arrest of Ships Convention provides obligation for Claimant, who (1) has been conducting wrongful or unjustified arrest; or (2) excessive security actually have been demanded or provided, to provide security for any loss or damage arisen as a result of the arrest. The amount of such security shall be imposed and determined by the Court who issues the arrest. The Court also empowered to determine the amount of compensation for the loss or damage arisen from the above two conditions. IV. Conclusion Indonesian Maritime Law provides an easier process in arresting ship/s. The law also gives advantages for the Claimant who has suffered loss caused by the ship. The arrest of ship is now can be conducted without submitting lawsuit against the person responsible. This regime makes the process of arrest more efficient and effective. Efficient since the process of arrest will take less time comparing to file a lawsuit. Effective means that the arrest may be used to compel person responsible for the ship to pay or to provide security in order to secure its debt. This is conducted without waiting final and binding decision from the Court. To this end, Indonesian Government should have issued enforcement regulation concerning arrest of ship. This is to avoid uncertainty as well as to create clarity for all Courts in Indonesia. Court in Indonesia, currently, still applying old regime in which a Claimant shall submit a lawsuit before a ship could be arrested.

Law libraries have evolved to become a service offered by talented professionals whose expertise can now be accessed at anytime, anywhere.

Not long ago, the law library was "a place". It housed printed materials and staff and provided work space for research. Lawyers went there to use books and consult librarians to locate and complete assignments. Today, the notion of a modern law library is very different, shaped by the skills of specialized researchers and information managers rather than by bookshelves and bound volumes.

The evolution of law libraries of course stems from technological advances. The invention of Lexis by Mead in the early 1970s and the eventual rapid growth of online legal research during the 1980s had a limited impact on law libraries. It was really in the 1990s that libraries began a dramatic transformation.

In the 1990s, the legal market saw a move to fixed-price contracts for online legal research, which enabled lawyers to work from their desks without visiting the library. Printing from online services, once cost-prohibitive and inconvenient, grew easier than directly using the library's collections. Enhancements to online systems also reduced – if not eliminated – the need to consult certain specialized resources (e.g., Shepard's Citation Service). Then the Web entered the research arena. The advent of portals, RSS feeds, alerts, anytime and anywhere access to proprietary data sources, mobile devices and applications, and other digital tools further facilitated the transition from print to digital screens.

Three other trends also shaped the law library. First, many firms built dedicated marketing departments, which fostered demand for business research. Second, new business intake became increasingly complex – often requiring more detailed business research. Between these two trends, many firms struggled to meet the demand and to decide which department should conduct business research. Third and separately, even before the recent economic crisis, many firms began reducing the physical size of their libraries, particularly in metropolitan areas where office space was at a premium. This was of most concern for those firms experiencing the greatest growth. Many simply could not obtain expansion space and so needed to re-configure available space for lawyers' offices. With lawyers using screens instead of books and firms needing more space, physical collections shrank, often dramatically.

Some mistakenly surmise that these trends endanger law libraries – making them victims of a new technological age or losers to business researchers. A more accurate assessment is that law libraries are simply evolving into a service rather than just a place [Editor's note: libraries and librarians, content and expert services, have always been inextricably linked]. With that shift, law librarians are arguably even more important today: the multitude of digital databases raises so many questions about source selection and accuracy and effective use, that professional research guidance and services is critical.

The "library as service" enables yet another change: library service providers have become a viable alternative to the in-house operation and management of information resources. Managing partners and general counsels are receptive to library service providers for many reasons. Providers enjoy economies of scale that enable them to offer, in many cases, a broader array of services as well as deeper access to more expertise and information sources than traditional in-house libraries. In addition to offering more depth by centralizing service across firms, a provider can defray administrative and technical services costs over a larger base, thus reducing the underlying service cost. A shift to a vendor-operated service can utilize a mix of onshore and offshore resources, which further reduces costs. Finally, a service provider can provide cost-effective, 24x7 coverage, which is typically impossible or very costly for smaller in-house libraries.

A closer look at some of the benefits – many of which stem directly from scale economies – explains why this option is increasingly attractive:

• Access to experts with specialized skills: Law firms and law departments, even very large ones, can gain access to highly specialized researchers whom they otherwise could not to afford to hire on their own. From the perspective of library professionals, employment with a provider who offers outsourced library services presents an opportunity to develop highly specialized skills. As a result, these providers often attract individuals with advanced degrees, including those for legal and business specialties. In contrast, these same professionals are often required, out of necessity, to be jacks-of-all-trades when managing all facets of an in-house library operation, including procurement of information sources, research, training and administrative oversight.

• Access to specialized information: Many library service providers offer experience with and access to highly-specialized, proprietary research databases, best practices knowledge and a far wider range of publications. Though content provider license terms present challenges to aggregating demand and negotiating price, providers can sometimes purchase specialized resources at lower rates than what individual firms or corporate legal departments can attain. In this way, providers often make it viable, particularly for small and mid-sized organizations, to gain access to information that was too costly or unreasonable to invest in previously.

• Regional "super libraries" and "niche" collections: Library service providers can leverage their greater access to specialized information and preferred supplier relationships to create cost-effective central libraries for geographic regions – an important advantage for customers who often cannot justify investing in resources to serve one-time uses or "niche" topics. In this way, service providers are also often able to dramatically to reduce the costs associated with the management of collections and journals – while at the same time decreasing duplicate purchases of these resources.

• Lower administrative burden: Using best practices honed through the delivery of library services to numerous firms and corporate legal departments, service providers can operate at greater efficiency than many traditional stand-alone libraries.

• In-depth training: In most traditional law libraries, highly skilled librarians must spend time training lawyers on proper use of proprietary databases. This distracts them from more valuable uses of their time. Service providers either staff individuals dedicated to training or utilize their preferred relationships with vendors to offer direct training and support.

Service providers offer another benefit, one that does not flow only from scale. Because providers are in a focused business, they typically collect and analyze operational data and then adjust their operations based on rigorous metrics. This means systematic monitoring of and reporting on research requests and source utilization. These metrics support delivering better client service, adjusting service levels to better meet lawyers' requirements, and optimizing the mix of data sources. The "service-level agreements" that govern providers assure law firms and departments that they receive the research support they need. The providers' usage metrics allow customers to adjust service levels up and down and, in some instances, can improve cost recovery from clients.

The significance of these benefits has not been lost on leaders in the legal industry. Globally, the outsourcing of library services is accelerating. Notably, such growth is not limited to just small firms.

For small- and medium-sized legal operations, outsourced library services can "level the playing field" with larger organizations. For example, with 40 partners and a staff of 350, Foot Anstey is a rapidly-growing UK law firm. While it had many of the sophisticated needs for library services, it lacked the scale to justify the size and scope of the in-house library and research team it envisioned. By engaging a provider of library services, Foot Anstey was able to expand the breadth and depth of support available to its lawyers and staff without increasing costs – enabling it to provide higher quality, more cost-effective service to its clients that is comparable to much larger firms.

"By outsourcing our library services, we gained access to a large team of information specialists with greater breadth of expertise, depth of experience and capacity for meeting our growing information needs," said Richard Gardiner, Foot Anstey's director of business development. Now we have all of the support and expertise we need at an affordable price without the administrative and management challenges."

Larger firms can gain benefits as well. Working with a provider can not only lower their costs but also free their professional law librarians to focus on what they do best – utilizing the skills that have always made them the first people lawyers turn to when they want to know where and how to conduct legal research. Furthermore, large firms can work with providers to rationalize both their physical collection and service offerings across multiple offices, countries, and practices.

Libraries have a long and cherished history. Technology and law firm economics have already changed the course of that history. Print is not dead, but it is much diminished. In the new world, librarians prove their value by continuous participation in solving lawyers' research requirements, not only library management. In the evolution of library from place to service, the role of law librarian is shifting to problem solver, consultant, and expert researcher. Outsourced library service is another phase in our continuously evolving idea of what we mean by a law library.

In the past few years, the emergence of social media and the easy ability for users to communicate has drastically changed the news media landscape. Social online communities has allowed many users to united over various issues and form strong widespread interest groups. Whether through user generated news stories, opinion blogs, message boards, interest based websites, there is a large shift towards transparency and participation. In the minds of internet users, user reviews and opinions has become the source to get authentic, objective news.

A great example of the impact of social media is the recent Obama campaign. His campaign utilized a full social media strategy posting 1,800 videos on YouTube that generated 110 million views. They created a Facebook group with 3 million fans and a Myspace page with nearly 850,000 friends.

One area that has also been impacted by social media is our legal system. Social media has become a new tool for litigators to use within trial practice for research and to influence public opinion. Litigators and prosecutors have started to utilize personal information on social media sites to their advantage. This has often happened in DUI cases where photos of young people intoxicated were used against them. They have attempted to manipulate social media to influence the opinion of the public and of jurors.

The Law of Attraction simply says that you attract into your life whatever you think about. Your dominant thoughts will find a way to manifest. But the Law of Attraction gives rise to some tough questions that don’t seem to have good answers. I would say, however, that these problems aren’t caused by the Law of Attraction itself but rather by the Law of Attraction as applied to objective reality.

Here are some of those problematic questions (all are generalizations of ones I received via email):

• What happens when people put out conflicting intentions, like two people intending to get the same promotion when only one position is available?
• Do children, babies, and/or animals put out intentions?
• If a child is abused, does that mean the child intended it in some way?
• If I intend for my relationship to improve, but my spouse doesn’t seem to care, what will happen?

These questions seem to weaken the plausibility of the Law of Attraction. Sometimes people answer them by going pretty far out. For example, it’s been said by LoAers that a young child experiences abuse because s/he intended it or earned it during a past life. Well, sure… we can explain just about anything if we bring past lives into the equation, but IMO that’s a cop-out. On the other hand, objective reality without the Law of Attraction doesn’t provide satisfactory answers either — supposedly some kids are just born unlucky. That’s a cop-out too.

I’ve never been satisfied by others’ answers to these questions, and they’re pretty important questions if the Law of Attraction is to be believed. Some books hint at the solution but never really nail it. That nail, however, can be found in the concept of subjective reality.

This section describes the most important recent changes to UK law in terrorist cases, and explains the new offences that have been created by three important recent Acts of Parliament:

• Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000)
• Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 2001)
• Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005)

Whilst, to an extent, previous anti-terrorist legislation (particularly those provisions designed to deal with paramilitary violence emanating from Northern Ireland) has been adopted in the new Acts, many new offences have been created. In addition, there has been a significant increase in police powers. The extent to which the police and prosecuting agencies can and do now operate has been widened, with a major impact on civil liberties.

The main provisions are:

• Terrorism
• Proscribed organisations
• Weapons training
• Directing terrorist organisations
• Possession for terrorist purposes
• Fund-raising
• Disclosure of information

It is important to note:
That there are many other offences, for instance relating to money laundering and public order, that arise in a terrorist context. Some of these are new, but have not been included here. Some arise from the operation of increased police powers and are explained in the section on Police Powers. In addition, the Terrorism Act 2006, which has very recently come into force, again creates new offences. Because of the controversy surrounding this Act, its main provisions are dealt with separately.

Registration of firms.- (1) An application may be made to the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of a firm for registration of the firm for the purposes of this Ordinance.

(2) No application shall be made under sub-section (1) unless, before the end of the income year relevant to the year for which assessment is to be made,-
(a) the firm had been constituted by an instrument of partnership;
(b) the said instrument specifies, among other things, the shares of the partners; and
(c) the said firm had been registered under the Partnership Act, 1932 (IX of 1932), or an application for registration under the said Act had been made.

(3) An application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form, be accompanied by such documents, be verified in such manner and be made on or before such date as may be prescribed.

(4) Where the Deputy Commissioner, after making such enquiry or requiring the firm to furnish such particulars, documents or evidence as he may think fit, is satisfied that the requirements of sub-sections (2) and (3) have been fulfilled and that there is, or was, a genuine firm in existence in the relevant income year constituted as shown in the instrument of partnership, he may, by an order in writing, made within three months of the date on which the return of total income was filed under section 55 or six months of the end of the income year, whichever is the earlier, register the firm for the purposes of this Ordinance and, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), such form shall be treated as a registered firm for the income year for which it is first registered and for all subsequent income years for so long as there is no change in the constitution of the firm; and if he is not so satisfied, he may, by an order in writing made within the aforesaid period, refuse to register the firm:

Provided that, where no such order is made within the aforesaid period, the firm shall be treated as a registered firm and all the provisions of this Ordinance shall, so far as may be, apply as they apply in the case of a firm registered under this sub-section.

(5) If, at any time after a firm has been registered or treated as a registered firm under sub-section (4) for any income year, the Deputy Commissioner has reason to believe that-
(a) there was no genuine firm in existence in such income year constituted as shown in the instrument of partnership; or
(b) the requirements of sub-sections (2) and (3) had not been fulfilled in respect of the said income year,

he may cancel the registration after giving a reasonable opportunity to the firm of being heard.